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THE BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS OF 1966
Frank R. Kennedy*

p

UBLIC Law 89-495, hereinafter referred to as the statutory lien
law, became law on July 5, 1966, after more than a dozen years'
effort on the part of the National Bankruptcy Conference and others
concerned generally with the improvement of bankruptcy law and in
particular with the rationalization of the treatment of statutory liens in
bankruptcy. The span of years marking the commencement and culmination of the campaign to enact Public Law 89-496, hereinafter referred to as the tax priority and dischargeability law, was even longer.
One is reminded of the fifteen years it took sponsors of the original
notice-filing provision of the federal tax lien law to get that reform
through Congress,' and of the seven years required to get part of a
comprehensive revision of the laws on federal tax liens, priorities, and
procedures enacted after four sections of the American Bar Association
and its Special Committee on Federal Tax Liens had devoted four
years of extraordinary effort to the preparation of a draft.2 The dimensions of the time and effort required to get these measures enacted are
a measure of the effectiveness of the Treasury Department in opposing
legislation which touches the revenues in ways it does not approve.3
* Professor of Law, Univ. of Michigan. A.B. 1935, Southwest Mo. State Coll.; LL.B.
1939, Washington Univ.; J.S.D. 1953, Yale University; Member of National Bankruptcy
Conference; the first half of this article appears in the January issue of the Joun:AL. oF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF REFEREES IN BAN R U-Y;

the second half

will appear in

the April issue.
1 In 1898, five years after the decision in United States v. Snyder, 149 US. 210 (1893).
the American Bar Association appointed a committee to call Congress' attention to the
implications of the decision and to urge remedial legislation. 21 A.B.A. REP. 108. 261 (1898).
Legislation supported by the Association was finally enacted in 1913. Ch. 166, 37 Stal
1016 (1913).
2 See Plumb, What Ever Happened to the A.B.A. Federal Tax Lien Legislation?, 18
Bus. LAw. 1103 (1963). The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. Law 89-719, wihich is the

product of the efforts described in the text became law on November 2, 1966. See 35
U.S.L. WEEK 38-46 (Oct. 25, 1966).
a Cf., H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, 21 (1952), noting that the Treasury
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The statutory lien bill and its predecessors were the subjects of two
Congressional hearings4 and one Senate hearing5 and four House reports6 and seven Senate reports.1 Versions of the bill were passed by the
House four times8 and by the Senate twice. 9 When identical versions
were passed by the House and Senate in 1960, death came by a pocket
veto administered by President Eisenhower.1" An apologetic message of

Presidential disapproval failed to disclose the real ground of the Treasury Department's objection but referred only to the possibility under
the bill that a chattel mortgage might be given an unwarranted priority11 over a federal tax lien in a situation involving circular priority.
Department objected to certain of the proposed amendments of the Bankruptcy Act
included in the Omnibus Bill of 1952, "not upon any ground that they would be ineffective or do not fairly and equitably deal with the rights and interests of the new and
old creditors, but rather that they may have an effect upon the revenue laws and collection of revenue." The Report went on to point out that the interests of the Government
were adequately protected, that, indeed, the Government was probably in a better position under the amendments than before.
4 Hearing on H.R. 4158 Before the Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); Hearing on H.R. 5195 and H.R. 6787 Before the Subcommittee
of the House Judiciary Committee, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
5 Hearing on S. 976 (H.R. 3438) and S. 1912 (H.R. 136) Before the Senate Committee on
Finance, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
6 H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. REP'. No. 454, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963); H.R. REP. No. 708, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. REP. No. 745, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
7 S.REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966); S. REP. No. 997, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. REP. No. 277, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965); S.REP. No. 1133, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); S. REP. No. 1242, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962); S. REP,. No. 1871, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
8 August 25, 1959; August 7, 1961; July 8, 1963; and August 2, 1965.
9 August 25, 1960, and June 23, 1966. H.R. 1961, a predecessor of the statutory lien bill
finally enacted, was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee of the 87th Congress,
but the bill was referred to the Senate Finance Committee, from which it did not emerge
during the remainder of the 87th Congress. See S. REP. No. 1133, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1964). H.R. 5195, another predecessor, was likewise buried by a reference to the Senate
Finance Committee after clearing the Senate Judiciary Committee during the 88th
Congress.
10 CoNG. REc., 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 106 CONG. REc. 19168 (1960).
11 The full text of the presidential veto message, dated September 9, 1960, is as follows:
I have withheld my approval of H.R. 7242, to amend sections 1. 57j, 64a(5), 67b, 67c,
and 70c of the Bankruptcy Act, and for other purposes.
I recognize the need for legislation to solve certain problems regarding the priority of
liens in bankruptcy, but this bill is not a satisfactory solution. It would unduly and
unnecessarily prejudice the sound administration of Federal tax laws. In some cases,
for example, mortgages would be given an unwarranted priority over Federal tax
liens even though the mortgage is recorded after the filing of the tax lien.
This and other defects of the bill can, I believe, be corrected without compromising
its primary and commendable purpose. The Treasury Department and the proponents
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Not only was this a result possible under the existing law, but the
Treasury Department had evinced no interest in a solution to that
problem proposed by the National Bankruptcy Conference and ultimately incorporated in the new section 67c(3).13
The tax priority and dischargeability bill passed the House four
times14 before it finally stuck. It is favorably reported on in seven
House and Senate reports.' 5
89-495
Public Law 89-495 amends four sections of the Bankruptcy Act-i,
64, 67, and 70-but its principal significance lies in its rationalization
of the treatment of statutory liens by overhauling subdivisions b and c
of section 67. The National Bankruptcy Conference recognized the
PUBLIC LAW

of H.R. 7242 have been working toward solution of recognized problems in present
law. Further cooperative efforts should produce satisfactory legislation that would
avoid the undesirable effects of this bill.
The persistent ground of disagreement between the National Bankruptcy Conference and
the Treasury Department throughout the legislative career of the statutory lien bill
related to the requirement that the federal tax lien be perfected by notice-filing in order
to prevail against the trustee in bankruptcy. See, e.g., S. REPa. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d

Sess. 11-12 (1966).
The objection that a chattel mortgage might take priority over an earlier perfected
tax lien was insubstantial. Since the Bankruptcy Act contained no guides for resolution
of the conflicts engendered by the circuity of priority created by former § 67c(1), the
result complained of was possible under existing law. Cf., New Orleans v. Harrell, 134
F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943). Indeed, priority might be given a mortgagee outside bankruptcy
over a federal tax lien notwithstanding the earlier perfection of the latter. See Gauvey v.
United States, 291 F.2d 42, 47 (8th Cir. 1961); United States v. Lebanon Woolen Mills
Corp., 241 F. Supp. 393, 398 (D.N.H. 1964); United States v. Anders Contracting Co., 111
F. Supp. 700, 703-04 (W.D.S.C. 1953); Schmitz v. Stockman, 151 Kan. 891, 893-94, I01 P.2d
962, 964-65 (1940).
12 This result was possible wherever a court chose the mode of resolution of circuity of
priority adopted in New Orleans v. Harrell, 134 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943).
s3See H.R_. RE. No. 708, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961).
14 On August 25, 1959, August 7, 1961, July 3, 1963, and August 2, 1965. After passage
by the House of Representatives in the 87th, 88th, and 89th Congresses, the bill was
approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee and then referred to the Senate Finance
Committee. By reason of extraordinary effort on the part of Senator Ervin of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, the Senate Finance Committee was forced to make a report
on the bill to the 89th Congress. See colloquy on the floor of the House as to the reasons
for the delay and difficulties in getting this legislation through the Senate. 111 Coxc. REC.
18247 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1965).
15 S.REP. No. 1158, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S.REP. No. 998, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966); S.REP. No. 996, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S.REP. No. 114. 89th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1965); S.Rn. No. 687, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965); H.R. REtP. No. 537, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961); H.R. REP. No. 735, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). See also S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966).
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difficulties with these two subdivisions back in 1953 when it appointed
a committee to study and recommend revision of section 67c.10 Early
drafts considered by the Conference are discussed in an article published a dozen .years ago in the Minnesota Law Review. 17 These drafts
included the basic features of the rationalization of the treatment of
statutory liens which was effected by Public Law 89-495.
Definition of "Statutory Lien"
The definition of a "statutory lien" in section 1(29a) was introduced
into the bill to overrule a holding of the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in In re Quaker City Uniform Co. that a chattel mortgage is a statutory lien.'8 After listening to reargument, the court withdrew its opinion based on this ruling but declined to recant what it
had said about the statutory character of the security interest there
involved. 19 The Quaker City opinion thus intimated that consensual
chattel security interests unaccompanied by possession might be immunized from attack as preferences, on the one hand, 20 but subject, on
the other, to invalidation for failure to pass muster under section
67c. 21 This untoward development explains the exclusion from the
16 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 7 (1953). There were
readily evident these half-dozen objections to the Act's treatment of statutory liens:
(1) Subdivisions b and c of § 67 were obscure, overlapping, and conflicting. (2) Section 67c
discriminated against statutory liens on personalty. (3) Section 67c discriminated against
statutory liens perfected otherwise than by possession. (4) Section 67c discriminated against
liens created by state law. (5) Section 67c overshot its target in avoiding liens which were
in no sense disguised priorities. (6) It generated circuity of priority. These objections are
discussed in Kennedy, Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy, 39 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703-22 (1955).
17 Kennedy, supra note 16, at 723, 732-33. See also HANNA & MACLACIILAN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS 710 (5th ed. 1957); Kennedy, Priorities Under the Bank.
ruptcy Act: ProposedAmendments to Section 67c and 70c, 11 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 51 (1957).
18 BANKR. L. REP.
58,778 (1956); see Kupfer, Astounding Decision Affecting Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 10 PERs. FIN. L.Q. REP. 130 (1956); Kupfer, A "Puzzlement": The
Quaker City Uniform Case, Its Impacts and Aftermath, 12 Bus. LAw. 280 (1957); Note,
70 HARV. L. Rsv. 1296 (1957); Note, 2 VILL. L. REv. 122 (1956).
19 In re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 1030 (1957). The court was able to reach the same result by another route and chose
only to assume for the purposes of its second opinion that a Pennsylvania chattel mortgage
was not a "statutory lien" within the purview of § 67c of the Act. The court did nevertheless cite the correct holding in In re Tele-Tone Radio Corp., 133 F. Supp. 739, 746-48
(D.N.J. 1955), which rejected an argument by the United States that a factor's lien drawn
under the New Jersey and New York factors' lien acts was a statutory lien within § 67c
of the Bankruptcy Act.
20 The new statutory lien law retains the immunity conferred by the Chandler Act on
statutory liens from avoidance under § 60.
:2 Since former § 67c(2) invalidated state statutory liens unaccompanied by possession,
the potential impact on consensual security interests in personal property was drastic,
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new definition of "any lien provided by or dependent upon an agreement to give security."
The definition is subject to a literal interpretation sufficiently broad
to include a lien arising pursuant to judicial proceedings, such as the
lien of a judgment, execution, attachment, garnishment, or proceedings auxiliary to execution.Y In view of the explicitness of the reference to liens by judicial proceedings in section 67a and the well understood role of that subdivision in respect to such liens, the risk that any
court will now assume that section 67c applies to them is surely minimal. There may nevertheless be argument whether statutory liens indude such an interest as the security interest in proceeds provided by
section 9-306(4)(d) of the Uniform Commercial Code.23 Since this
security interest is one dependent upon an agreement to give security,
24
the definition seems to me to exclude this security interest.
Section 67c(1)
It would be useful to discuss illustratively what happens to a statutory attorney's lien claimed on money coming into the attorney's hands
after insolvency of his client-debtor if bankruptcy occurs while the
funds are still in the attorney's possession. Let it first be noted that
although the lien arose after insolvency and on the eve of bankruptcy,
section 60, the preference provision, does not apply. The introductory
language of section 67b excluding statutory liens from the operation of
scope of section 60 has not been changed. But a statutory lien must pass
the new three-way test of section 67c(l).
Disguised Priorities
The first clause invalidates any statutory lien which first becomes
effective upon (a) insolvency of the debtor, or (b) upon distribution or
liquidation of his property, or (c) upon execution against his property
levied at the instance of some creditor. As the legislative reports accompanying the statutory lien bills point out, this clause (A) of section
67c(l) strikes at patent priorities which are disguised as liens. 5 Such
liens are generally for the benefit of wage claimants.2 0
22 These Hens do arise by force of statute upon the taking of certain steps and do not
depend upon an agreement to give security.
23 See Kennedy, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Insolvency: Article 9,
67 Co.t. L.J. 113, 116-17 (1962); Marsh, Book Review, 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rrv. 898, 907-03 (196q.
24 Ibid.
25 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 277, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965).
26 See, e.g., CAL. CoDE Cit. PRoc. §§ 1204, 1206; IowA CODE A.,. §§ 626.69-26.73,
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The attorney's lien does not fall under the condemnation of this
clause although the debtor is insolvent when the attorney's lien arose.
The statute requires the lien to be one which first becomes effective
upon the debtor's insolvency. Concurrence of insolvency and the inception of the lien is not enough. The lien must be one which arises upon
insolvency, distribution, liquidation or levy-that is, one which really
is a rule of distribution because it does not apply if there is no distribu27
tion in prospect.
The Bona Fide Purchaser Test
Is the attorney's lien perfected or enforceable as against a bona fide
purchaser on the date of bankruptcy? This involves a study of state
law, but I should surmise that under the law of practically every state
a statutory lien against a fund in the attorney's possession can not be
displaced by any transfer thereof by the debtor.
The introduction of the bona fide purchaser test into the Bankruptcy Act's scheme for adjusting the rights of statutory lienors rests
on the premise that if a statutory lien does not follow the property
into the hands of a bona fide purchaser, it is primarily a statutory
device for establishing priority among competing creditors and ought
not to prevail as against the order of priorities established by section
64 in the event of bankruptcy. Since a statutory lienor in possession of
the collateral typically prevails against any bona fide purchaser of the
encumbered property from its owner, the adoption of the bona fide
purchaser test probably does not withdraw protection formerly ac681.13 (1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-51 (Supp. 1965). Other examples are found in United
States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (1936); United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 258 (1923).
The Knott case involved a trust fund described by the Supreme Court as an "inchoate
general lien," embracing deposit of securities for the benefit of unsatisfied judgment
creditors and Florida creditors at the date the debtor surety company was placed in
liquidation. In the Oklahoma case, a statutory lien was given the state for the benefit
of depositors against assets of a bank or trust company effective upon initiation of In.
solvency proceedings.
27 The term "insolvency" as used in i 67c(l)(A) presumably means insolvency in the
bankruptcy sense whereas any state statute creating a lien "upon the insolvency of the
debtor" may well contemplate insolvency in the equity or commercial sense. Since this
clause also invalidates any statutory lien which becomes effective "upon distribution or
liquidation" of the debtor's property or upon an execution levied by some other creditor,
the lack of correlation in the usage of "insolvency" should be inconsequential. The alternatives in clause (A) clarify its purpose to reach liens intended to operate only to confer
a priority in connection with a settlement or distribution to creditors. The invalidation
of such a lien should depend neither on whether the debtor is actually insolvent under
§ 1(19) of the Bankruptcy Act nor on whether the statutory lien actuated by the inception
of a liquidation or settlement requires concurrent insolvency in the bankruptcy sense.
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corded such a lienor. Application of the test will undoubtedly require
the court often to investigate a question which may not have previously
been authoritatively determined under nonbankruptcy law, viz.,
whether a particular statutory lien is effective against a bona fide purchaser. If no effort has ever been made to enforce the lien against a
bona fide purchaser, that fact would be evidence of a practical construction tending to bring the lien within the invalidating language of
section 67c(1). If the lien is a secret one never relied on except as
against other creditors competing for shares of a debtor's property, the
lien is vulnerable to the trustee's attack under this clause.
The Uniform Commercial Code has provided answers for a good
many questions regarding rights in personal property hitherto in
limbo. Does it help here? Not as much as you might think or like.
While a statutory lien technically comes within the definition of a security interest in section 1-201(37) of the Code, it is not regulated by
Article 9,28 except in a minor respect shortly to be noted. It need not be
perfected by notice-filing to be good against lien creditors under section
9-301, and its relative priority is not governed by section 9-312. There is
a provision in the Code-section 9-310-which deals with the relative
priority of statutory liens, but the operation of this section is limited to
liens for persons who in the ordinary course of their business furnish
services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest
and who have possession. Such lienors have priority over perfected
security interests unless a statute provides otherwise. Article 9 does not
apply to rights in judgments, 29 to assignments of accounts, contract
rights, and chattel paper for collection only,3 0 or to assignments of tort
claims.31 Moreover, notice-filing is not required to perfect security
interests in accounts or contract rights which are an insignificant part,
either alone or in combination with other assignments to the same
assignee, of the outstanding accounts or contract rights of the debtor.32
It seems fair to say that the Code does nothing to make a statutory lien
on personalty more vulnerable to frustration or defeat by a subsequent
transfer by the debtor to a bona fide purchaser. At the most, the Code
has only marginal relevance in the construction of section 67c.
Suppose a statutory lien is perfected by notice-filing as against a
28 See UNITOR-,

COIERCILA.

CODE §

9-102(2). [Hereinafter cited as UCC.]

29 UCC § 9-104(h).

UCC § 9-104(t).
§ 9-104(k).
32 UCC § 9-302(1)(e).

30

31 UCC
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conventional bona fide purchaser but is not enforceable under applicable lien law against a buyer in the ordinary course of business. 8 Arguably the lien ought nevertheless to be effective against the trustee. 84 A

statutory lien against collateral being sold in ordinary course is, in any
event, likely to be a tax lien, which must be accompanied by possession
in order to prevail against the first two classes of priority claimants,88
or a landlord's lien for rent, which is invalidated by clause (c) of this
paragraph without regard to its state of perfection. 80 Any other variety
of statutory lien against inventory or accounts receivable subject to
sale in the ordinary course was probably invalid under former section
67c(2). The absence of evidence of any legislative intent to validate
such a lien against the trustee, the tenuousness of the suggestion that
a bona fide purchaser does not include a buyer in the ordinary course,
and the similarity of a statutory lien of shifting collateral held for sale
to a priority serve to render the statutory lien on such collateral of
doubtful validity.
The third test posed by section 67c(l) cuts down only statutory rent
liens and liens of distress for rent. The attorney's lien runs into no
difficulty.
What is the impact of the new legislation on the statutory lien of a
landlord if he takes possession before bankruptcy? Section 67c no
longer puts any premium on possession except insofar as it will save a
tax lien on personalty from postponement under section 67c(3). Obtaining possession before bankruptcy may nevertheless be advantageous
33 For a definition of "buyer in the ordinary course of business," see UCC § 1-201(g).
84 That satisfaction of a bona fide purchaser test does not necessarily require the lien

to be enforceable against buyers in the ordinary course of business, see Coin Machine Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, 192 F.2d 773, 776 (4th Cir. 1951); Moore & Tone, Proposed
Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression, 57 YALE L.J. 683, 698 (1948); cf.,
Bankruptcy Act §§ 60a(2), (6); UCC §§ 1-201(9), 2-403, 3-302, 7-501, 8-302, 9-307, 9-308, 9.809.
The history of the bona fide purchaser test as incorporated in § 60 of the Bankruptcy
Act nevertheless argues against the position here suggested. A reason often mentioned for
abandoning the bona fide purchaser test for timing a transfer of personal property under
§ 60 of the Chandler Act was that it could never be satisfied by security interests In collateral subject to sale in the ordinary course of trade by the debtor. See H.R. REr. No.
1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1949); 40 GEo. L.J. 457, 458, 460 (1952).
The legislative history of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 also suggests the prevalence
of an opinion that prior to the enactment of § 6323(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,
a federal tax lien perfected by notice filing was effective against an innocent buyer in the
ordinary course of trade. See 112 CONG. REc. 21309 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1966). See also
Schmitz v. Stockman, 151 Kan. 891, 895-96, 101 P.2d 962, 965-66 (1940).
85 See 3Bankruptcy Act § 67c(3) discussed at notes 45-64, infra.
86 See Bankruptcy Act § 67c(l)(C).
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to a statutory lienor in two situations: (1) It may serve to perfect his
lien against a bona fide purchaser and, if not for rent, to validate it
against the trustee under section 67c(l)(B). (2) It may comply with a
state prerequisite for a rent lien which, notwithstanding its invalidation by section 67c(1)(C), qualifies the landlord for priority under
section 67c(2)'s last sentence. The same observation applies to the advantage of getting a distraint for rent before bankruptcy: Although
neither a common-law nor a statutory distraint can support a valid
lien in bankruptcy, it can serve to entitle the landlord to a priority.3 1
In some states, e.g., Pennsylvania,38 there is a right of distress for rent
which constitutes no lien or security interest prior to the actual distraint. Until there is a statutory or common-law lien effective as against
a judicial lien creditor at the time of bankruptcy, there is nothing for
section 67c to act on. If state law gives a landlord a priority anyway,
the rent lien is superfluous in bankruptcy.
Preservation of Liens Under Section 67c(2)
Suppose now that a state tax lien against realty which is not invalidated by section 67c(l) is inferior to an unfiled federal tax lien because
of inchoateness. Since the trustee prevails over the federal tax lien
(under section 67c(l)(8)) but yields to the state tax lien, circuity of
priority is created. How does the new law resolve it? The trustee may,
pursuant to section 67c(2), ask the court to order the federal tax lien
to be preserved for the benefit of the estate. In such event, the state
tax lienor would receive the same portion that would have been its
lot outside bankruptcy. The priority of the federal tax lien over the
state tax lien would be formally preserved, but the proceeds allocated
to the federal lien would be applied to the administrative expenses,
wage claims, and creditors' expenses listed in section 64a(l), (2), and (3),
before distribution of the balance on a parity among the tax claimants
entitled to priority under section 64a(4). If the federal tax lien is not
37

All Hens of distress for rent, whether statutory or common law, were postponed and

restricted by the former § 67c, regardless of possession. 4 CoTuaT, BAmurrcy 1 67.23
67.27[2], 67.28 (14th rev. ed. 1964). Specific provisions directed at liens of distraint in
bankruptcy have evolved because of the tendency of unrestricted rent liens to consume
entire estates and because of the susceptibility of the use of distraint, a mode of self-help,
to frustrate the objectives of bankruptcy distribution. See IL. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. 16 (1937).
38 In re George Townsend Co., 180 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Kupfer, The Quaher
City Uniform Case-A Supplementary Note, 12 Bus. LAw. 539 (1957). The law of New
Jersey is apparently similar. See Note, 14 RtrrGrms L Rav. 587, 597-99 (1960).
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so preserved, the second sentence makes it clear that the state tax lien
is benefited to the extent that it is relieved of the burden of the invalidated federal tax lien.
Enforcement By Sale before Bankruptcy
Suppose an attorney on the eve of his client's bankruptcy takes his
fee out of the proceeds of a recovery on behalf of his client. Does the
enforcement of the attorney's statutory lien against the proceeds in
such a manner and under such circumstances render the attorney liable
to the client's trustee? Section 67c does not apply to liens enforced by
sale before bankruptcy. 39 This lien is enforced without sale, but that
surely should cause no difficulty for the attorney. His statutory lien
would have been valid if bankruptcy had befallen his client before
enforcement, and nothing in the Act enables the trustee to invalidate
the lien merely because it was enforced before bankruptcy. The case
is like the numerous ones in the reports rejecting attacks on prebankruptcy enforcement of liens which would have been valid as against
the trustee if not enforced. 40 The first clause of section 67c(5) is probably unnecessary, but it simply retains in the Act a feature found in
the opening clause of former section 67c. The clause makes clear that
the trustee cannot under section 67c reach back and strike down or
impair any lien already enforced before bankruptcy takes over, even
though the lien might have been vulnerable to postponement or indeed invalidation if bankruptcy had occurred before the sale.
Perfection Post Bankruptcy
The provisos of section 67c(2)(B) have puzzled some readers. The
first proviso says in effect that any statutory lien which has not been
perfected against a bona fide purchaser at the date of bankruptcy may
nevertheless be so perfected if (1) the lien is good against the trustee
under section 70c at the date of bankruptcy, and (2) the time allowed by
state law for perfection against a subsequent bona fide purchaser has
not expired.
Does this proviso in effect establish a lien creditor test for statutory
liens? Section 70c establishes the lien creditor test in bankruptcy and
all conflicting liens, interests, and claims against the property of the
bankrupt must meet that test to survive against the trustee. This has
89 See Bankruptcy Act § 67c(5).
40 See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY

60.22 (14th rev. ed. 1966).
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been the law for years, as the United States discovered to its dismay in
41
United States v. Speers.
The proviso authorizing perfection after bankruptcy was a feature
of section 67b before the recent amendment. The United States as a
tax lienor sought to take advantage of this provision of the former law,
but the Supreme Court properly pointed out that although section
67b permits belated perfection to save a statutory lien from avoidance
under section 60, there is nothing in the Act or its policy to exclude
applicability of section 70c to unperfected tax liens at the date of
bankruptcy.4
It nevertheless oversimplifies matters to say that the proviso goes
no further than to impose a lien creditor test. If a statutory lien cannot
be perfected so as to be made enforceable against a subsequent bona
fide purchaser, it falls within the condemnation of Section 67c(l)(B).
As the legislative reports have pointed out repeatedly, such a lien is a
tenuous one, defeasible by the debtor's transfer,43 and serves primarily
the purpose of conferring priority on the statutory lienor over other
creditors.
Although the proviso does not help the United States if it has failed
to perfect its lien by notice-filing before bankruptcy, it enables mechanic lienors and other lien claimants whose liens are inchoate at
bankruptcy to complete the state statutory procedure within the two
limitations prescribed by the proviso. Suppose that a mechanic's lien
need not be perfected against a lien creditor but does have to be noticefiled within a 60-day or 90-day grace period in order to prevail as
against an intervening bona fide purchaser, i.e., one who acquires his
rights during such a period. If perfection after the lapse of the grace
period nevertheless is effective as against a subsequent bona fide
41 382 U.S. 266 (1965). One of the exasperating aspects of the campaign for enactment
of HR. 89-495 was the insistence by the Treasury Department that the Supreme Court

changed the law in Speers and thereby exposed the Government's unfiled federal tax lien
to new risks of such seriousness that it would now have to notice file all tax liens without
regard to (1) the cost and inconvenience to the government of adopting such a policy or
(2) the hardship to the tax debtor resulting from such a step. The Treasury Department's
views are reflected in S. REP'. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 11-12 (1066). The Treasury
Department sought to amend the statutory lien bill to overrule United States v. Specers
and indeed persuaded a majority of the Senate Finance Committee to recommend such
an amendment. Id. at 12-13. A minority of that committee exposed the fallacies of the
majority's report in a short dissent, id. at 22-24, and the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary unanimously adopted the views of the minority of the Senate Finance Committee. S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1966).
42 United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266, 277.78 (1965).
43 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966).
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purchaser, can the mechanic's lien be perfected after bankruptcy as
against the trustee? The answer most consistent with the literal language of the statute is in the affirmative. The prior law simply authorized perfection after bankruptcy of any lien arising before bankruptcy
if perfection was required and occurred "within the time permitted by
and in accordance with the requirements of such laws." The statute
did not particularize the kind of perfection requirement it was talking
about-i.e., one requiring perfection within a prescribed time in order
to relate back as against intervening lienors or purchasers or one
requiring perfection within a prescribed period in order to be effective
as against subsequent lienors or purchasers. The same kind of ambiguity is to be found in section 60a(7) and has given rise to a difference of
opinion as to whether a purchase-money security interest must be
notice filed within the ten-day period prescribed by section 9-301(2) of
the Code in order to avoid a ruling that the security interest is a
transfer for an antecedent debt under section 60. 44 It would appear
that the ambiguity has been avoided in section 67c(1)(B)'s proviso. But,
to repeat, perfection after bankruptcy is permitted only if at bankruptcy the lien is then good against the trustee under section 70c and
if perfection occurs within the time required to validate the lien
against subsequent bona fide purchasers. If, however, the mode of
perfection required by the applicable lien law, is seizure, notice filed
with the bankruptcy court continues to be the substitute prescribed
by the Act.
The Postponement of Tax Liens
The provision of Public Law 89495 which has caused the most
trouble is section 67c(3), the postponement subdivision. 45 Paragraph
44 See 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE U.C.C. 995, 1065.67
(1966); 2 GILMORE, PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY 1328-29 (1965).
45 Section 67c(3) is a revision of former section 67c(1), which postponed landlords' liens
of distraint as well as tax liens. It was not a part of H.R. 5195, introduced on February
27, 1957, in the 85th Congress and embodying the proposal originally submitted by the
National Bankruptcy Conference. The Conference wanted to get rid of all the agony and

the anomalies caused by the novelty introduced in 1938 and aggravated in 1952 of subordinating certain liens to two classes of unsecured claims and restricting such liens in

relation to inferior classes of unsecured claims. The case of In re Quaker City Uniform Co.,
238 F.2d 155 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1030 (1957), came along in 1956 to confirm the
Conference's opinion that the postponement feature of the old law was a mischief to be
eschewed in any new attack on the problems of the statutory lien. This thrust toward

simplification stalled the whole bill, however, as the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts saw in it a threat to the continued health of the Referees' Salary and Expense Fund and the Judicial Conference withheld its approval of the bill. Although the
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(3) was the subject of numerous conferences between representatives
of the National Bankruptcy Conference and the Treasury Department
over the course of a half dozen years, held for the ostensible purpose
of ironing out differences. The paragraph wras considerably revised
from time to time to accommodate stylistic preferences of Treasury
Department conferees and to assure adherence to the New Britain
formula" for solving the riddle of circular priority in lieu of the New
Orleans v. Harrel47 approach originally proposed by the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
A good deal of the steam behind Public Law 89-495 was generated by
In re Quaker City Uniform Co., a Third Circuit opinion, which the
Supreme Court refused to review. 48 As observed earlier,40 the National
Bankruptcy Conference had come to appreciate the defects of section 67c
before the appearance of Quaker City Uniform. A construction by the
Fifth Circuit back in 1943 in New Orleans v. Harrell* apparently did
not disturb the Treasury Department or anybody else. That involved
a postponable city tax lien which had priority over an indefeasible
chattel mortgage on the bankrupt's property. The court very reasonably read section 67c(l) to subordinate the city's tax lien but not the
chattel mortgage. The result was to allow the chattel mortgage to rise
above the tax lien to the top.
The mischievous potentialities of section 67c were not fully or generally appreciated until 1956 when the Third Circuit delivered its
infamous Quaker City Uniform decision. 51 The dispute involved the
bill as originally introduced had the support of the National Bankruptcy Conference, the
American Bar Association, the National Commercial Finance Conference, the American
Bankers Association, and other organizations, it became clear after a hearing before a
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee on June 29, 1957, that the bill was going
nowhere in its original form. And so paragraph (5) emerged.
46 As the Treasury Department preferred to describe the pattern of solution of the
circularity program. See I.R.S. Technical Information Release No. 316, April 26, 1961.
The New Britain formula resolved the problem arising out of priority for a cit"s liens
over a mortgage, which was prior to a federal tax lien, which was in turn superior to the
city's liens. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954). Since New Britain required
the subordinated liens of the city to be paid out of the indefeasible lien of the mortgagee
in order to protect the federal tax lien from encroachment by the citys liens, Professor
Gilmore suggests that the New Britainformula would actually require a different ordering
of the distribution than that adopted by the cases codified in § 67c(S). See 2 Gu.iom,
SECURrY INTER.srs IN PERSoNAL PROPERTY 1035, 1045 (1965).
47 134 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943). See text accompanying note 50 infra.
48

238 F.2d 155 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1030 (1957).

49 See text accompanying note 16 supra.

50 134 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943).
51 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1030 (1957).
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disposition of $10,000, the proceeds of the sale of a debtor's personalty
subject to a chattel mortgage for $6000 and a landlord's lien of distraint
for $4000. Though subsequent in time, the lien of distraint was accorded priority by Pennsylvania law over the chattel mortgage. This
entailed no serious consequence for the chattel mortgage until bankruptcy. The debtor had accumulated wage obligations entitled to
priority under section 64a(2) of over $10,000. Since the landlord's lien
was superior to the chattel mortgage and the administrative expense
and wage priorities were superior to the landlord's lien, the "necessary
implication" was that neither security claimant could share in the
$10,000 proceeds; both went down the drain locked together in place.
That was the law of the Third Circuit12 until the recent legislation
codified the view taken by the Ninth Circuit, 3 Fifth Circuit, 4 and a
district court opinion from New York."
The postponement provision now applies only to tax liens unaccompanied by possession. The Treasury Department objected to the
invidious discrimination against its tax collectors, ignoring the fact
that the only other postponable liens under prior law were landlord's
liens, which are now invalidated, whether or not perfected as against
bona fide purchasers and whether or not accompanied by possession.
The majority of the Senate Finance Committee, however, accepted the
resolution of the circular priority problem prescribed by paragraph (3),
recognizing that tax liens cause most of the circularity problems that
arise.56
52 Quaker City Uniform was followed in In re Einhorn Bros.. Inc., 272 F.2d 434 (3d
Cir. 1959), and In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 494 (E.D. Pa. 1964), approving
the postponement of a security interest of the Small Business Administration along with a
state tax lien to administration expenses and wage claims. For evidence of persistent
dissatisfaction with the Quaker City Uniform ruling, see 111 CoNG. REc. 18246 (daily ed.
Aug. 2, 1965).
The Quaker City Uniform case was also followed in In re Independent Truckers, Inc.,
226 F. Supp. 440, 449-50 (D. Neb. 1963). The order of distribution approved by the court
here was as follows: (1) claims entitled to priority under § 64a(l), (2); (2) county tax lien;
(3) chattel mortgage; (4) federal tax lien.
53 California State Dep't of Employment v. United States, 210 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1954).
But cf., Gurabedian v. Griffin Steel & Supply Co., 340 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1965), criticized in
Kennedy, The Inchoate Lien in Bankruptcy: Some Reflections on Rialto Publishing Co. v.
Bass, 17 STAN. L. REv. 792, 819, 821 (1965).
54 Jordan v. Hamlett, 312 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1963), purporting to distinguish but
apparently overruling New Orleans v. Harrell, 134 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943), and reinstating
In re Empire Granite Co., 42 F. Supp. 450 (M.D. Ga. 1942). But cf., Brod v. Third Realty
Co., 340 F.2d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1965), where it appeared that the court was actually
following Quaker City Uniform rather than either of its own prior rulings.
55 In re American Zyloptic Co., 181 F. Supp. 77 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
56 S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966).
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Let us see how it works: Suppose that a debtor has personal property
worth $10,000 subject to the following liens and that the indicated
developments occur:
Federal tax lien arising on assessment 1/15
Chattel mortgage executed and perfected57 1/30
Federal tax lien notice-filed 2/1
Bankruptcy of debtor 3/1
Priority claims under section 64a(l) and (2)

$5,000
$7,000

$5,000

The disposition required by section 67c(3) is as follows:
Chattel mortgage
Priority claimants
Federal tax lien

$7,000
$3,000
0

Suppose now that the chattel mortgage is perfected after the federal
tax lien is perfected but within 21 days so as to be indefeasible in
bankruptcy. The disposition required by section 67c(3) is best understood if taken in two steps:
57 In the interest of avoiding collateral inquiries the assumption is made here that
the chattel mortgagee makes a contemporaneous advance and pcrfects without knowledge
of the existence of the tax lien. The definition of "security interest" introduced by the
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 requires the interest to have become protected against a
"subsequent judgment lien arising out of an unsecured obligation" and the holder to
have "parted with money or money's worth." INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 6323(h)(1). There
is no requirement that the security interest be one for a contemporaneous advance or that
the holder be without knowledge in order to prevail as against a federal tax lien not
perfected by notice-filing. The test of the existence of a security interest that it have
become protected against a "subsequent judgment lien" is novel and a little troublesome
since ordinarily a judgment lien can attach only to real property, and in some states,
like Michigan, a judgment lien attaches to neither personal nor real property. A reasonable assumption as to congressional intent here is that the security interest must have
become perfected as against a creditor who obtains both a judgment on an unsecured
obligation and a lien by judicial proceedings to enforce the obligation. Such a creditor
would include one who obtains a judgment in proceedings initiated by attachment or
garnishment, or one who levies an execution against his debtor's property to enforce a
judgment, as well as one who obtains a lien against the debtor's realty by docketing a
judgment. On such an assumption, however, the test poses a difficulty if applicable lien
law differentiates between what is effective against an attachment creditor who has
proceeded to judgment and what is required as against a judgment creditor who has
obtained an execution. See, e.g., Mich. Title Standards 13.4 and 14., 37 MIcn1. S. BAn J.
33-37 (1958). It cannot be doubted, in any event, that the trustee is a "judgment lien
creditor" under the amended version of § 70c enacted by Pub. Law No. 89-195 and
discussed hereinafter. See statements of Congressman Poff in regard to the relation of
Pub. Law 89-495 and the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 112 Co.G. Rsc. 21310 (dailey ed.
Sept. 12, 1966).
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Disposition outside bankruptcy:
Federal tax lien
Chattel mortgage
Step II: Disposition in bankruptcy:
Priority claimants
Chattel mortgage
United States

[Vol. 1: 149

Step I:

$5,000
$5,000
$5,000
$5,000
0

This is the pattern of distribution ordered under former section 67c(1)
by the better considered and more numerous cases. 58
Section 67c(3) is in effect a lien preservation provision of the kind
bankruptcy judges and lawyers are familiar with.5 9 That is, the trustee
is enabled to preserve the postponable tax lien for the benefit of the
claimants entitled to priority under section 64a(l) and (2). Lawyers in
the Treasury Department, however, would not abide any version of
the postponement provision that used that drafting approach.
The first sentence of the paragraph declares the rule when there
is no other valid lien on the property. Priorities (1) and (2) are paid in
full before the postponed tax liens are paid. Such postponed tax liens
are nevertheless paid in full before unsecured tax claims are paid
anything under the priority provision, section 64a(4).
58 See cases cited notes 53-55 supra; 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY ch. 39 (1965). The court noted in In re Meisel, 159 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1958), that

on the facts before it the same result would be reached by application of the rule adopted
in either the Ninth Circuit or the Third Circuit and therefore did not choose between
them.
It has been suggested that another solution of the circularity of priority is preferable to
that chosen by these courts and codified in § 67c(3). Note, 14 RUTrcERS L. REV. 587, 593
(1960). See also 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTEREMs IN PERSONAL PaoPrY 1045 (1965), noting
that this was the solution adopted by the district court in the case of In re Quaker City
Uniform Co., 134 F. Supp. 596 (E.D. Pa. 1955). The suggested solution requires the amount
allocable to the indefeasible lien to be first set apart and the balance applied to the
claims entitled to priority under § 64a. The postponed tax lien is then paid out of the
amount allocated to the indefeasible lien. This solution seems objectionable on the
ground that it shifts the incidence of the lien postponement provision from the tax lien
against whom it was directed to the indefeasible lien which was not intended to be
affected by it. Indeed, it protects the postponed lien against postponement to the extent
of the value of the indefeasible lien and at the expense of the indefeasible lien.
59 See Bankruptcy Act §§ 67a(3), 67d(6), 70c(2). Former § 67c of the act contained lien
preservation provisions in its last sentence, and, indeed, paragraph (2) of present § 67c,
previously discussed, includes a lien preservation provision. The Treasury Department
apparently did not see any potential application or threat to federal tax liens posed by
this paragraph. It is to be noted that the preservation effected by paragraph (3) is not
a matter left to the discretion of the trustee or the court as preservation is in the provisions of the act explicitly authorizing it.
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The second sentence declares the rule of priority when a postponed
tax lien is superior in right to some other lien like a chattel mortgage
which is unavoidable in bankruptcy, as in the hypothetical case considered in the preceding paragraphs. The amount allocable to the
postponed tax lien goes to priorities (1) and (2), subject to these qualifications: (1) costs of the sale creating the distributable proceeds must
first of all come out of them, 60 (2) if the total of the priorities is less
than the amount allocable to the tax lien, the tax lien gets any difference,6 1 (3) if the priorities exceed the amount of the tax lien, the priorities are nevertheless not allowed to cut into the amount allocable to
the indefeasible lien or security interest.6 2 It is to be remembered that
the policy of section 67c is directed against accumulated tax liens, not
chattel mortgages and like consensual security interests, which are
subject to challenge under section 60 as well as section 70c and e; and
not judicial liens, like attachment or judgment liens, which are vulnerable to attack under section 67a. If the indefeasible security interest or
lien were not protected against collateral attack here by the priorities,
a small tax lien of, e.g., $50, coupled with a sizable accumulation of
priority claims of, e.g., $6,000, which but for bankruptcy was well
protected by adequate collateral worth $10,000.
A reference to "prior indefeasible liens" in the third sentence of
section 67c(3) has proved confusing to a number of readers. 3 It contemplates the situation where there are (1) an indefeasible lien, such
as $5,000 duly perfected first security interest for a present advance,
(2) a postponable tax lien for, e.g., $4,000, and (3) a junior but indefeasible security interest for, e.g., $3,000. The distributable proceeds
are $10,000. Obviously the first $5,000, after defrayal of the cost of
sale, goes to the holder of the senior indefeasible lien; the next $4,000
60 Both the second and third sentences of § 67c(S) recognize the necessity of first paying

for the costs of any sale of personal property which produces proceeds for distribution
under this paragraph. The cost of the sale is, of course, to be distinguished from adminis-

trative expenses entitled to priority under § 64a(1) of the Act but not incurred in connection with the conduct of the sale.
61 See the last sentence of Bankruptcy Act § 67c(S).
62 See the second sentence of Bankruptcy Act § 67c(3).
63 The Senate Finance Committee Report curiously explained its approval of the
proposed § 67c(3) as resting on a belief that "the language relating to 'prior indefeasible
Hens' refers only to liens which are prior in time to tax liens." S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 11 (1966). Ordinarily a prior indefeasible lien will no doubt be prior in time, but
since priority in time does not always confer priority in right, the committee's statement

oversimplifies the role of the reference in the third sentence. Thus it may apply to the
situation where a prior-in-time federal tax lien on personalty is not perfected by noticefiling until after a subsequent security interest is perfected by notice-filing.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1967

17

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1967], Art. 2

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1: 149

allocable to the postponable tax lien goes to priorities (1) and (2) as
far as required-if $2,000 suffices, the remaining $1,500 of the $4,000
goes to the tax lienor; and finally the balance of $1,000 remaining in
4
the fund of $10,000 goes to the junior security interest holder.
The purpose of the second and third sentences of section 67c(3) is
to assure that neither the senior nor the junior security interest holder
gets any more or less in bankruptcy than out. That fulfills the bankruptcy policy of neutrality toward these indefeasible liens. But it is
not the policy of the Act to be neutral toward tax liens on personalty
unaccompanied by possession. Congress decided back in 1938 that such
liens should yield to administrative expenses and wage claims. Although the tax lienor in the hypothetical case just considered would
get paid in full outside bankruptcy before the holder of the junior
security interest would get anything, the latter is getting no advantage
in bankruptcy at the expense of the former. The relative priority of
the liens inter se is preserved, and the impact of the postponement is
confined by the second and third sentences of the liens which Congress
identifies in the first sentence of section 67c(3).
Amendment of Section 70c
This brings us to the amendment of section 70c. While this amendment does several things, an animating purpose was to make clear
that the trustee in bankruptcy is a judgment lien creditor for the purposes of the federal tax lien statute. 65 The clarity of this proposition
had become clouded after the Supreme Court's much misunderstood
ruling in Gilbert Associates.66 The Court there had sustained priority
for an unfiled federal tax over a municipal tax lien notwithstanding a
characterization of the latter by the state supreme court as having the
"nature of a judgment." 67 As the Supreme Court pointed out in United
States v. Speers,6 8 the ruling in Gilbert Associates that "judgment creditor" was used in the federal tax lien statute "in the usual, conventional
sense of a judgment of a court of record" was delivered in a quite
04

For an example of a case that would involve application of the third sentence of

§ 67c(3), see Brod v. Third Realty Co., 340 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1965). Although § 67c(3) was
intended to codify the rule followed by the Fifth Circuit in Jordan v. Hamlett, 312 F,2d
121 (5th Cir. 1963), it is not clear that the Court of Appeals adhered to that rule in the
Brod case. See note 54 supra.
65 See, e.g., S.REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1966).
66 United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
67 Id. at 364.
68 382 U.S. 266, 269-72 (1965).
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different context from that presented when a trustee in bankruptcy
challenges an unfiled federal tax lien. The Speers case noted that Congress had conferred the status of a judgment creditor on the trustee
but three years before it required notice of the federal tax lien to be
filed to validate it as against a judgment creditor.0 9 For nearly forty
years thereafter there had been no reason to suppose that the trustee
did not have the rights of a judgment creditor against an unfied
federal tax lien or against any other variety of lien which has not been
perfected in accordance with a law protecting judgment creditors. 0
In 1950, the reference to "judgment creditor" was deleted from the
"strong-arm clause" of section 70c, 71 but as former Referee Archie
--2
Katcher of Detroit pointed out in the pages of the Referees' Journal,
the congressional purpose had been to strengthen the position of the
trustee by giving him a specific judicial lien against all the property of
the bankrupt as of the date of bankruptcy, irrespective of who then
had possession. The Supreme Court took due note in Speers of this
congressional purpose, 73 of the unsuccessful effort by the Treasury Deof the
partment to exclude trustees in-bankruptcy from the protection
notice-filing provision in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,74 and of
the congressional approval of including trustees within its protection
69 Id. at 272. The strong-arm clauses, now found in § 70c. were originally added to
§ 47a(2) of the act in 1910. For a dear indication that the congressional purpose was
thereby to endow the trustee with the rights of a judgment creditor, see 45 Co.;c. REC.
2277 (1910). The original notice filing provisos of the federal tax Hen law, REv. STAT.
§ 3186, were among the last measures approved by President Taft on March 4, 1913.
70.49 (14th rev. ed. 1964). An article by an attorney in
70 See 4 Co-rms BANKR pTcY

the Office of the Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Feigenbaum, Tax
Problems, 25 REF. J. 107, 109 (1951), 30 TAMS 440, 451 (1952), did die Cooper v. Cantrell,
266 App. Div. 940, 46 N.Y.S2d 29 (1943), a per curiam holding that a trustee in bankruptcy
was not a judgment creditor within former § 276a of the New York Debtor and Creditor
Law, which authorized an action to avoid a fraudulent transfer. The court acknowledged
that the law had been changed shortly before the decision in order explicitly to protect
the trustee in bankruptcy. Mr. Feigenbaum did not cite any of the numerous rulings
listed in 4 CoLLmt, op. cit. supra, at 1413 n. 3c, that a trustee is entitled to prevail over
any interest in the bankrupt's property not perfected under state law against a judgment
creditor.
71 64 Stat. 26 (1950).
72 Katcher, Powers of Trustee Under Amended Section 70c-Vcakcned or Strength70A7(3] (14th rev. ed. 1959).
ened? 27 RE. J. 29 (1953). See 4 COLLIER, BANKRUp'Tcy
As the House report accompanying the 1950 amendment observed, "a trustee in bankruptcy occupies the position of a universal judgment or lien creditor with all such a
creditor's remedies .... " H.R. REP. No. 1293, 31st Cong., Ist Scss. 4 (1949). The purpose
of the amendment was ignored in Feigenbaum, Tax Problems, 25 Rr. J. 107, 109 (1951).
73 United States v. Speers, 382 U.S. 266, 273 (1965).
74 Id. at 273-74. The Court's opinion noted that § 301.6323-1 of the Treasury Regula.
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disclosed by the legislative history of the statutory lien bill itself'
(although the bill was not finally to be enacted until over six months
later). After the Government failed to convince the Supreme Court
that the trustee had lost his status as a judgment creditor by virtue
of the 1950 amendment of section 70c and of the decision in Gilbert
Associates in 1953, it sought an amendment of the statutory lien bill to
undo United States v. Speers.76 The majority of the Senate Finance
Committee blandly accepted the Treasury Department's argument
which had been rejected two months earlier by the Supreme Court that
"prior to the Speers decision unrecorded tax liens (assessed tax claims)
generally were considered to be valid against the trustee in bankruptcy
and therefore superior to claims of general creditors (represented by
the trustee in bankruptcy)." 77 The minority of the committee pointed
out that the proposal to validate unfiled federal tax liens against the
trustee not only contradicted the Supreme Court's holding in United
States v. Speers but would "relieve the Treasury Department of a
burden Congress placed upon it over 50 years ago." 78 The Senate
dons on Procedure and Administration [26 C.F.R. § 301.6323-1 (1954)] nevertheless Incorporated the material rejected by the 83d Congress.
75 Id. at 274-75, citing the bills introduced in the 86th, 88th, and 89th Congresses and
the reports of approval made by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees to the
88th Congress.
76 S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1966). The recommendation of the Senate
Finance Committee was not a bald proposal that unfiled federal tax liens be validated
against the trustee in bankruptcy but only that such liens be valid if filed within one year
after assessment or one month after bankruptcy. If adopted, the bill, originally introduced
to rationalize the treatment of statutory liens in bankruptcy, would have generated the
following congeries of incongruities: (1) Although the federal tax lien must be perfected
by notice filing in order to be valid against a judgment creditor and although the trustee
is entitled to prevail against liens not perfected against a judgment creditor, an nnperfected federal tax lien would for a year after assessment prevail against the trustee In
bankruptcy if perfected within one month following bankruptcy. (2) Although a creditor
who obtains a judgment lien against the bankrupt's property within four months before
bankruptcy prevails over any unfiled federal tax lien against the property, and the trustee
in bankruptcy can avoid the judgment lien unless he fails to carry the burden of proof on
the issue of the bankrupt's insolvency under § 67a, a federal tax lien could still be perfected after bankruptcy against the trustee if the year following assessment had not
elapsed. (3) Although the federal tax lien must be perfected by notice filing in order to
be valid against a bona fide purchaser and although the trustee is entitled to prevail
under § 67c(l)(B) against any statutory lien not perfected as against a bona fide purchaser,
the unperfected federal tax lien would be deemed valid against a bona fide purchaser for
a year following assessment though not filed until after bankruptcy. One can only
conjecture as to the effect this provision would have had on the titles of bona fide purchasers of property subject to unfiled federal tax liens if their sellers had become bankrupt
during the year following assessment.
77 S. REP. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966).
78 Id. at 22, 24.
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Judiciary Committee unanimously adopted these minority views in its
final report on the bill which preceded its enactment.70
The clarification of the status of the trustee vis-a-vis the unfiled
federal tax lien was not the only objective of the amendment of section
7 0 c. Those remedial rights which accrue to the judgment creditor with
an execution returned unsatisfied were sheared off by the amendment
of the subdivision in 1950.80 A creditor seeking equitable relief in
connection with the avoidance of a transfer-discovery, injunction,
receivership, levy on an equitable asset, or reformation or cancellation
of a writing-may be required by state law to show that he had exhausted his remedy at law by obtaining a judgment with an execution
returned unsatisfied. 8' Moreover, the creditor who has pursued his
legal remedies to this extent may be afforded the benefit of a presumption that the judgment debtor is insolvent.82 This presumption may be
of material assistance to the creditor, of course, in seeking to avoid a
transfer by the debtor. The general deterioration of the distinction
between law and equity and the legislative liberalization of the rules
governing the availability of relief at the foot of the judgment have
made the loss of the special rights reserved to a judgment creditor with
an execution returned unsatisfied more theoretical than real. Moreover,
the creditors of a bankrupt and their representatives, the trustee, are
furnished by the Bankruptcy Act with a formidable battery of weapons
which ordinarily make the availability of equitable relief under state
law academic. Nonetheless, it was an inadvertence to deprive the
trustee of any advantage given by nonbankruptcy law to a judgment
creditor with an execution unsatisfied, and the amendment restores to
him whatever rights inhere in this status. Accordingly the trustee is
now accorded three different statuses by section 70c: (1) a creditor with
a judgment as of the date of bankruptcy, (2) a creditor with an execution returned unsatisfied as of the date of bankruptcy, and (3) a judicial
lien creditor as of that date.
A saving clause has been added to negative any implication that a
transfer voidable in part under this provision is voidable in toto. The
question has been raised whether this new third sentence of section
70c overrules Moore v. Bay.83 It does not. Moore v. Bay is a construction of section 70e. The sentence in question validates interests only as
79
80
81
82
83

See note 41 supra.
See 4 CoLumR, BANRUT-c
70A7[3] (14th rev. ed. 1964).
See 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 86 (rev. ed. 1940).
See, e.g., Bartlett v. Webber, 218 Iowa 632, 656-37, 252 N.W. 892, 895 (1934).
284 U.S. 4 (1931).
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against the trustee's rights under section 70e. The applicability of
Moore v. Bay has, of course, previously been significantly restricted by
section 9-301 of the Uniform Commercial Code.8 4 The new saving
clause of section 70c is comparable to but distinguishable from section
9-401(2) of the Code. That provision saves any partially perfected security interest to whatever extent that perfection does comply with the
Code. An example might be a security interest executed by an agreement covering an automobile and equipment, some affixed and some
not affixed. Notice filing might be proper for some of the equipment
collateral but not for the automobile or the fixtures. Both section
9-401(2) and section 70c allow the security interest to stand to the
extent the law has been complied with. 5
But section 9-401(2) says that the incomplete filing is effective against
any person who has knowledge. Section 9-301(3) implies that the trustee
is bound if all the creditors he represents have knowledge. The new
amendment does not deal with notice or knowledge or good faith
of the trustee any more than did prior versions of the strong arm clause
of section 70c. It is to be inferred, that the cases treating the trustee as
a judgment creditor without knowledge or actual notice of any unperfected lien8 6 are still good law but the United States Supreme Court
has never passed on the question of whether creditors' actual notice is
relevant under section 70c.
The last sentence of section 70c, described as the "chameleon clause"
in the legislative reports, 8 7 simply clarifies what has never been seriously doubted, viz., that the trustee is not required to maintain consistency in his postures while attacking various liens and transfers.
An interesting historical sidelight is that several versions of the
statutory lien bill, including H.R. 7242 which was vetoed in 1960,8
contained language overruling Constance .v. Harvey8 9 by negativing
any construction which would relate this trustee's status as a creditor
84 Moore v. Bay was principally useful to the trustee in states where he could step into
the shoes of a creditor entitled to attack a belatedly perfected security interest without
being limited in his recovery by the amount of the creditor's claim, and even though
perfection occurred before bankruptcy. 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
70.95[4] (14th ed. 1964).
The impact of the Code on the doctrine of Moore v. Bay is discussed in 2 GILMOaR,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.3.1 (1965).

85 See S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966).
88 See 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
70.53 (14th rev. ed. 1964).
87 S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1966).
88 See note 11 supra.

89 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955).
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to a date before bankruptcy. 90 In Lewis v. ManufacturersNat'l Bank,91
the Supreme Court delivered an opinion accomplishing the purpose
of this feature of the bill and quoted from the House Reports accompanying the bill which had been vetoed,92 and the language was thereafter deleted from the bill as no longer necessary. 3
Section 67c(4)
For the same kind of reason, a provision invalidating a lien which
secures a penalty not allowable under section 57j was deleted from the
bill after the Supreme Court settled a conflict on this point which had
developed among the circuits. 4 The Government had sought to use
the Treasury-inspired veto of the statutory lien bill in 1960 as evidence
of a congressional intent to limit applicability of section 57j to unsecured penalties. The Court pointed out dryly that the congressional
failure to amend could not be deemed adoption of the Government's
construction in view of the prevailing divergence of judicial holdings
on the effect of section 57j as then written. 5 The bill as finally enacted
retained a provision, viz., section 67c(4), denying to the trustee an
option to preserve a lien securing such penalty.
PUBLIC LAW 89496
Origin
The second of the two bills approved on July 5, 1966, innovates by
limiting the priority of unsecured tax claims in bankruptcy and by
enabling a bankrupt to obtain a discharge from certain tax claims.
Although it is not clear where these proposals of long overdue reform
originated, Professor MacLachlan reported in his hornbook that a
proposal to discharge taxes due more than one year before bankruptcy
except in cases of false returns and failure to file required returns originated in the Bankruptcy Committee of the American Bar Association
under the leadership of Frank Olive, and that the National Bankruptcy
Conference had embraced this idea and promoted IG Professor J. AV.
Moore and Philip Tone discussed an early version of the Conference's
90 See, e.g., H.R. 7242, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1959).
91 964 U.S. 603 (1961).
92 Id. at 607-08 n. 6.
93 See H.R. REP. No. 708, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1961).
9- Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38 (1962).
95 Id. at 41-42.
ANKRuPrcy 102 (1956), citing H.R. 5829, 80th Cong., 2d Secs. § 3
96 MAcLAcELAN
(1948), and HMR. 120, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1948).
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tax dischargeability and money bill in a Yale Law Journal article
published in 1948, 97 and they cited discussions of the need for a limitation on tax priorities published during the preceding five years. 8
Public Law 89-496 thus is the fruition of over twenty years' effortY0
Frank Olive and the others who launched this project and labored
on it in its early days probably turned no cartwheels in the Elysian
fields where they have since gone, when the President signed Public
Law 89-496. The substitute of the three-year for the one-year limitation
on the taxes to be accorded priority and nondischargeability and the
provisos engrafted on section 17a(l) at the instance of the Treasury
Department cut down significantly on the relief to be afforded bankrupt tax delinquents. But the bill as finally enacted is a step in the
right direction, and the vigor with which the Treasury Department
opposed it suggests that it may have a more potential impact than is
readily apparent.
Section 2a(2A)
The new section 2a(2A) is a revision and transposition of section
64a(4)'s second proviso. Some difference of opinion has developed respecting the effect of the new language. Does it codify or change existing law? The Senate Finance Committee approved this amendment of
the law, expressing at the same time its understanding that it made
"no change in present law under which a bankruptcy court cannot
adjudicate the merits of any claim, including a Federal tax claim,
which has not been asserted in the bankruptcy proceeding by the filing
of a proof of claim."' 00 Even if it were true that the amendment effects
no change, it has long been clear that the bankruptcy court may determine in summary proceedings the amount and legality of any tax
claim against property in the custody of the court, 101 including any tax
07 Moore & Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression?,
57 YALE L.J. 683, 699-705 (1948).
98 Furst, Tax Problems in Bankruptcy and Reorganization, 18 RF. J. 17, 66 N.J.L.J.
175 (1948); Montgomery, Recent Developments and Proposed Reforms in Respect to Tax
Claims in Bankruptcy, 19 RF. J. 31 (1944); Musgrave, The Tax Priority Bugaboo, A6
CoRp. REORG. 48 (1945); Olive, Taxes in Bankruptcy Proceedings,25 TAXES 5 (1947).
90 Indeed, Professor Moore and Mr. Tone described efforts made in 1937 to eliminate
the reference to federal tax claims in § 17 of the Chandler Act. A bill omitting the reference passed the House. Moore & Tone, supra note 97, at 700 n.68, citing H.R. REP. No.
1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, 67 (1937).
100 S. RE,. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966).
101 New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1906); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S.
323, 329 (1966). "Numerous cases have held that the trustee in bankruptcy may litigate
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claim secured by a lien, 10 2 whether or not a proof of claim is filed. The
committee's reading of this explicit grant of jurisdiction would reduce
it to a nullity, since it is clear without the provision that the bankruptcy court can determine the amount and legality of any claim duly
filed in a bankruptcy case. 103
Section 64a(4)'s second proviso as it read before the amendment
was a broad, unqualified, and apparently exclusive grant of jurisdiction
to the bankruptcy court to decide any and all questions as to the
amount and legality of taxes which arise in the course of administration of the bankrupt estate. But Professor Moore and Mr. Tone pointed
out in their Yale Law Journal article' 0 4 that this provision had been
substantially restricted, largely by reason of gratuitous observations of
the Supreme Court in Arkansas Corp. Comm'n v. Thompson decided
back in 1941.105 It was gratuitous because the case actually involved
questions concerning post-petition taxes arising during the course of
the reorganization of the Missouri Pacific Railroad. Section 64 did not
and does not apply to such taxes.
Placement of the jurisdictional grant in section 2a makes sense and
eliminates any doubt that the bankruptcy court can decide questions
regarding the amount and legality of taxes whether assessed or due
before or after the petition is filed. Moreover, the applicability of the
jurisdictional grant in reorganization proceedings under Chapter X
and section 77 as well as in straight bankruptcy or any other proceeding
under the Act is now made clear.
The Court in Arkansas Corp. Comm'n v. Thompson held that the
bankruptcy court could not review a determination of the tax liability
of the debtor in reorganization previously made by the Arkansas Commission, a quasi-judicial agency. The Court said that Congress did not
the amount of tax liability before the referee, rather than pay the tax and sue for refund."
Cohen v. United States, 115 F.2d 505, 506 (Ist Cir. 1940).
102 Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 US. 225, 228-29 (1931); Klebanoff v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 246 F. Supp. 935, 951-52 (D. Conn. 1965); In re New York & Philadelphia Padcage Co.,

225 Fed. 219, 222 (D.N.J. 1915); 4 CoLLtE, BANFituvrcY

70.97[2]. 70.98[11], 70.99 (14th

rev. ed. 1964). Indeed, it has been held that seizure of the bankrupt's property by tax
officials before bankruptcy does not divest the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction conferred
by the proviso in former § 64a(4). In re Florence Commercial Co., 19 F.2d 468 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 275 U.S. 542 (1927). When another court has prior custody, however, the
bankruptcy court should yield its claim of jurisdiction under the statutory grant in the
exercise of comity. In re White Star Ref. Co., 74 F.2d 269, 271 (5th Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
294 U.S. 727 (1935).
103 See Lyford v. City of New York, 137 F.2d 782, 786 (2d Cir. 1943).
104 Moore & Tone, supra note 97, at 700.
105 313 U.S. 132 (1941).
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in section 64a(4) intend to make the federal courts super-assessment
tribunals over state taxing agencies. 106 Congress certainly did mean to
give some revising power to the bankruptcy courts over tax assessments,
and section 2a (2A) is an attempt to spell out the extent of the court's
jurisdiction to review tax questions.
The new paragraph is explicit that the bankruptcy court may determine "any question arising as to the amount or legality of any unpaid
tax, whether or not previously assessed, which has not prior to bankruptcy been contested before and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction." This paragraph codified
the view taken in the better considered interpretations of the effect of
the second proviso of former section 64a(4). 10 7 It negates whatever
implication may be drawn from the Supreme Court's dictum in
Arkansas Corporation Comm'n v. Thompson that the amount of
an assessment of a property tax by a state agency, or of any other tax
by any other agency, is beyond examination by the bankruptcy court.1 08
Although it is not as clear as it might be, 10 9 the trustee (or receiver)
apparently may challenge the amount or legality of a tax in the bankruptcy court even though the time for raising this kind of question in
any nonbankruptcy forum has run against the bankrupt. The need
for protecting the creditors against the untoward consequences of
neglect by the taxpayer to pursue remedies available to him was
pointed out to Congress when it was considering a revision of Section
64a(4) in 1937.110 The new provision bars the trustee from raising the
question as to any unpaid tax onlywhen a prior contest has resulted in
an adjudication by a competent tribunal. It may be doubted that the
trustee (or receiver) can successfully raise questions in the bankruptcy court regarding an assessment which the bankrupt was not
106 Id. at 145.
107 Lyford v. City of New York, 137 F.2d 782, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1943); 3 CoLLmR, BANKRuPTCY
64A07[2] (14th rev. ed. 1966).
108 Cf. In re 168 Adams Bldg. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 105 F.2d 704

(7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 808 U.S. 628 (1940); In re Gould Mfg. Corp., 11 F. Supp. 644
(E.D. Wis. 1935).
109 Referee Reuben Hunt of Los Angeles proposed an amendment of

§ 64a(4) whldi

would have made clear the authority of the bankruptcy court to determine tax questions
that had not previously been adjudicated, irrespective of any act or omission of the bankrupt before bankruptcy. House Hearings on H.R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 161-62 (1957).
The reference to the bankrupt's prior conduct did not survive in the final version of the

Chandler Act. See 3

COL-ER, BANKRUPTCY

2204-06 (14th rev. ed. 1966); Montgomery,

Recent Developments and Proposed Reforms in Respect to Tax Claims in Bankruptcy, 19

REP. J. 31, 82 (1944).
110 Ibid.
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entitled by either statutory or constitutional law to raise outside the
bankruptcy court.
Even though the bankrupt has paid a questionable tax, the trustee
may still challenge it under certain circumstances. The latter part of
the new section 2a(2A) enacts the premise underlying the actual holding of Arkansas Corporation Comm'n v. Thompson, viz., that the
trustee or receiver can prosecute an appeal from or review of a determination of a tax question which has been contested before a judicial
or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction if the time for
appeal has not expired."' The implication is clear that in such case
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is not to review but to authorize
pursuit by the trustee or receiver of whatever recourse remains available under nonbankruptcy law. If the tax has not been paid and a
prebankruptcy contest has not resulted in a determination, the first
part of section 2a(2A) indicates that the bankruptcy court has discretion to hear and determine the question itself or to allow the other
tribunal to decide the matter. 112 If a questionable tax has been paid
before bankruptcy but no determination of the questions that might
be raised as to its amount or legality has been made, the new paragraph
is silent as to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. If the bankrupt
retained at bankruptcy the right to challenge the tax, it seems clear
that the trustee acquired the right under sections lie and 70a(5) of
111 The trustee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad, which was undergoing reorganization
in § 77 proceedings, had challenged an assessment of the railroad's property by the
Arkansas Corporation Commission. After an adverse determination by the Commission.
which the Supreme Court said was not ministerial but quasi-judicial, the trustee did not
avail himself of the right to appeal to a state circuit court but sought relief in the bankruptcy court. In holding that the bankruptcy court should have dismissed the trustee's
application, the Supreme Court said that "Nothing in this language [i.e., of the second
proviso of former § 64a(4)] indicates that taxpayers in bankruptcy or reorganization are
intended to have the extraordinary privilege of two separate trials, one state and one
Arkansas Corp. Conmn v.
federal, on an identical issue of controverted fact .....
Thompson, 313 U.S. 132, 142 (1941).
112 The Supreme Court has sometimes taken a rather generous view of its own role in
reviewing the exercise of discretion by a bankruptcy court in retaining jurisdiction of a
controversy which it might have allowed to proceed in a state court. See Texas v.
Donoghue, 302 U.S. 284, 289 (1937); Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 US. 478,
483-84 (1940). The countervailing considerations arguing for exercise of jurisdiction by
the bankruptcy court are set out in Wurzel, Taxation During Bankruptcy Liquidation, 55
HA-v. L. REv. 1141, 1150-51 (1942). There is no implication whatsoever that the trustee
should contest taxes accruing during the administration in any forum other than the
bankruptcy court, as he did in Arkansas Corp. Comm'n v. Thompson. "The bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction over allowances for administrative expenses, such as current taxes, is
exclusive." Wurrel, supra at 1176.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1967

27

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1967], Art. 2

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1: 149

the Bankruptcy Act, but he would be compelled to pursue it in whatever forum would have been available to the bankrupt.
Section 17a(1): Taxes "Legally Due and Owing"
Section 17a(1) starts out now by saving taxes from discharge only if
they become "legally due and owing" within three years preceeding
bankruptcy. The Treasury Department objected strenuously to the
term "legally due and owing." Those words have been on the books
longer than has the Sixteenth Amendment.118 There is a redundancy
and perhaps some inelegancy in the expression "legally due and
owing," but these words have served fairly well the needs of bankruptcy administration in section 64a(4), as has the single word "due" in
section 17a(l). 114 The words apply to all kinds of tax liabilities incidentally-not just those of concern to the Internal Revenue Service.
In any event, the meaning of "legally due and owing" is for the courts
to interpret, as it has been for over sixty-five years. The referees will
continue to apply the standards of section 64a(4), and the courts passing
on the effect of a discharge will apply the language of section 17a(l).
A good deal of case law bears on this question, and this writer has
not undertaken a study of when the various kinds of federal, state, and
local taxes become "legally due and owing" for the purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act. Collier has not neglected the question, however."51
Section 17a(1): The First Proviso
Whatever "legally due and owing" means, the first proviso of section
17a(l) makes determination of the due date of a tax academic in many
situations falling within the contemplation of the original sponsors of
this measure.
Clauses (a) and (b) of the first proviso deal with a type of case recognized from the beginning as one requiring special treatment, that of
the taxpayer who does not make a return required by law.110 No time
limit applies to taxes which were not assessed before bankruptcy
against such a taxpayer, but it is not to be supposed that this clause has
113 They were part of the original provision on conferring priority for tax daims in
the act of 1898. See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 2047 (14th rev. ed. 1966). The single word
"due" had been used in § 17a(1) since 1898. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
17.01[2] (14th rcv.
ed. 1966).
114 See 3 COLLER, BANKRUPTCY
64.405[l] (14th ed. rev. 1966); 1 id. 17.14.
115 Ibid.
116 See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
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any effect on taxes for years when the taxpayer did make a return. A
curious corollary of the first two clauses is that government is in a
better position vis-a-vis such a bankrupt tax delinquent if no assessment
is made before bankruptcy, since an assessment sets a one-year statute
of limitations in motion.
Clause (d) of the proviso, saving taxes "with respect to which the taxpayer made a false or fraudulent return, or willfully attempted to in
any manner to evade or defeat," is also one which the original proponents of the bill were willing to accept. 17 It makes a good deal more
sense, however, as a ground for denying relief from discharge than it
does as a consideration in ordering priorities in the distribution of
bankrupt estates.118
Clause (c) of the proviso saves from discharge any tax liability not
reported on the bankrupt's return and not assessed before bankruptcy
because of the pendency of proceedings by the bankrupt challenging
the tax. Counsel for the Government undoubtedly will view the taking
of any improper deduction on a duly filed income tax return as well as
the failure to include any taxable income on such a return as an instance of an unreported tax. Again the Government is in a more vulnerable position if assessment precedes the taxpayer's bankruptcy than
if bankruptcy comes first. If the assessment is made first, the three-year
limit applies, and its period runs from the date the tax was "legally due
and owing." If bankruptcy occurs before assessment, no time limit
applies at all in determining the priority, or immunity from discharge,
of the taxes ultimately assessed.
Clause (e) of the proviso, protecting the Government's claim against
a bankrupt for taxes collected or withheld from others, reflects the
firm and familiar policy of special liability and accountability imposed
on the collector or holder of such taxes.
The Saving Clause for Exempt Property
An unlettered clause of the first proviso of section 17a(l) denies
the defense of discharge to a bankrupt when and if a tax collector
pursues any remedy available by non bankruptcy law against property
set apart as exempt to the bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act. It is
to be noted that there is no requirement in this clause that the tax
117 Ibid.
118 Contrast the treatment of tax penalties, which are not allowable even as general
claims against bankrupt estates but which are not dischargeable. I CoLuER, B,&muprcy

17.13 (14th rev. ed. 1966).
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have attached as a lien to such property, let alone that the lien have
been perfected as against the trustee. Perfection might of course be a
factor in settling a conflict between two or more claimants entitled to
proceed against such property, but whether a lien is perfected against
exempt property is a matter of no concern to the trustee in bankruptcy. 1 9 There is, moreover, no reason why a failure to comply with a
requirement designed to make a lien a matter of public notice should
ever afford the debtor a defense. It deserves emphasis that the clause
does not withhold the defense of discharge when and if the tax collector
proceeds against exempt property acquired by the debtor after his
bankruptcy.
The Saving Clause for Liens
The second proviso of section 17a(1) states simply "That a discharge
in bankruptcy shall not release or affect any tax lien." Counsel for both
the Treasury and Justice Departments seem to have been completely
120
mystified by the last two clauses of the amendment of section 17a(l).
The notion that a claim should be discharged and yet be enforceable
against exempt property or to the extent secured by a lien against preexisting property transcended their conception of a discharge as either
an absolute bar or utter nullity. The objection of the Government that
the clauses created "an12 internal inconsistency" which would raise
"many grave problems"' could not be taken seriously, however, by
anyone who has examined the nature and operation of a discharge
122
in bankruptcy.
It has been reported that the Government now intends to rely on
the second proviso as a basis for enforcing discharged tax claims against
after-acquired property whenever notice of assessment has been filed
119 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Schulein, 282 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1960); In re Espelund, 181
F. Supp. 108 (W.D. Wash. 1959); Charnesky v. Urban, 245 Wis. 268, 14 N.W.2d 161 (1944).
120 See letters of opposition to the bill from the Treasury and Justice Departments
quoted in S. REP. No. 114, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11, 13-14 (1965).
121 Id. at 14.
122 A discharge does not extinguish a debt but affords the bankrupt an affirmative
defense. It does not prevent enforcement of any valid security arrangement effcctive at
the date of bankruptcy, either against property then in existence or against a surety on the
obligation discharged. The enforceability of liens against nonexempt property notwithstanding discharge was established under the 1841 Bankruptcy Act, Peck v. Jenness, 7
How. (U.S.) 612 (1849), and the same rule was applied to liens on exempt property under
the Act of 1867 in Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886). The rules of these cases have been
accepted unquestioningly under the present Act. See COUNTRYMAN, CASES ON CREDITORS'
RIGHTS 596 (1964). The enforceability of discharged claims against sureties and co-debtors
rests on § 16 of the act.
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before bankruptcy. Whether a tax lien is perfected by notice filing is
an irrelevancy insofar as its enforceability against the tax debtor is
concerned, but if all federal taxes assessed before bankruptcy survive
discharge, section 17a(l)(b) saving only certain taxes if assessed within
a year before a bankruptcy makes no sense at all. As the discussion of
its purpose
the second proviso in the legislative reports indicates,
is to accord the same post-discharge treatment to tax liens as that accorded to mortgages and other consensual security interests. The discharge of tax claims over three years old will not affect their enforceability against valid security held at bankruptcy. The clear implication
of the discussion is that after such security is exhausted, no deficiency
may be asserted against any after-acquired property.
The role of a discharge in withdrawing any basis "for the creation
of an enforceable lien upon a subject not existent when the bankruptcy became effective" was established in the classic case of Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt.2 4 That case also established the extraordinary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to enjoin state court litigation which
threatened to frustrate the benefits of the decree of discharge, and
which would have gone against the bankrupt unless and until he had
carried his case from the municipal court through the intermediate
court of appeal and supreme court of the state to the Supreme Court
of the United States.12 5 If the Government does take the position that
the filing of a notice of assessment before bankruptcy immunizes a federal tax claim from discharge as against post bankruptcy acquisitions,
a case falling more clearly within the scope of both aspects of Local
Loan Co. v. Hunt would be difficult to imagine. ' -" The summary remedies available to the Government, the smallness of the stake, the
unequal position of the taxpayer and the Government in litigating
the merits of the controversy, and the notorious unwillingness of the
Service to abide by adverse rulings by lower courts all argue for
exercise by the bankruptcy court of its power to vindicate its decree
particularly when and if the Government seeks to enforce a discharged
tax liability against post bankruptcy earnings.
123 S. REP. No. 114, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1966).

292 U.S. 234, 243 (1934).
M Id. at 241-42.
126 See, e.g., United States v. Mighell, 273 F.2d 682, 685 (loth Cir. 1959); Sword Line,
Inc. v. Industrial Conm'n, 212 F.2d 365, 370 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 US. 830 (1954);cJ.,
Allen v. Regents of the University of Georgia, 304 U.S. 439, 445 (1938); Miller v. Standard
Nut Margarine Co., 284 US. 498, 510-11 (1932); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 46 (1922); 1
CAsn', FEDERAL TAX PRACTzCE § 2.26 (1955). But cf., Enocks v. Williams Packing & Nay.
124

Co., 370 US. 1, 6-7 (1962).
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An issue which can easily arise under this reading of the proviso
involves marshalling: Can the Government insist that its lien against
property in existence at bankruptcy be enforced so far as possible to
collect therefrom taxes that are not entitled priority or immunity from
discharge and so as to maximize the portion of any tax deficiency that
will survive bankruptcy as a nondischargeable liability? The answer
is undoubtedly affirmative.
Correlation of Nondischargeability and Priority
The amendment of section 64a(4) by Public Law 89-496 correlates
the priority of taxes precisely with their nondischargeability. Such
correlation is not new, 127 but, as earlier indicated,1 28 considerations
bearing on dischargeability do not necessarily operate in the same way
with respect to priority. Thus, fraud or wilful neglect on the part of
the bankrupt may be a sufficient justification for withholding discharge
from a liability arising out of or otherwise related to the bankrupt's
conduct, but it does not necessarily furnish a reason for according priority to such liability over debts owing other innocent creditors.
The list of provable debts provided by section 63a has never included
taxes, but the provision for priority of taxes in section 64a(4) has
rendered the omission inconsequential. Moreover, the explicit exception of tax debts from the operation of a discharge by former section
17a(l) was tantamount to a recognition that tax claims were provable:
otherwise the exception would have been unnecessary. Are the taxes
which are neither entitled to priority under section 64a(4) now immunized from discharge by section 17a(l) nevertheless provable as
general claims? If Congress had intended to exclude such claims from
any share in bankrupt estates, it would surely have made its purpose
29
more clear.
A new proviso added to clause (4) negatives any priority for taxes
other than that provided by the clause. This proviso anticipates and
rejects the Government's invocation of section 3466 of the Revised
Statutes'"0 as a basis for asserting priority under section 64a(5) for those
federal taxes falling outside the scope of 64a(4). The phraseology of
Compare § 17a(5) with § 64a(2) of the act.
See text accompanying note 104 supra.
Taxes were regarded as quasi-contractual and therefore provable under § 63a(4) in
In re Mercury Engineering, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 376, 882 (S.D. Cal. 1946).
180 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964), which is a law of the United States granting priority to the
United States within the contemplation of § 64a(5). See 3 CoTT.mR, BANKRUrrey
64.502
(14th rev. ed. 1966).
127
128
120

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss2/2

32

Kennedy: The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966
1967]

BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENT

the proviso is indicative of a Congressional understanding that taxes
denied priority may nevertheless be proved as general unsecured
claims. It would at any rate be curious of Congress to deny priority for
a class of claims if it intended that such claims should not even be
proved or allowed as general claims.
It is conceivable that a tax collector may occasionally face a difficult
choice: Should he waive his right to file a tax claim entitled to priority
in bankruptcy distribution in order to collect a larger amount on a
general tax claim which will be discharged if not paid? Ordinarily, no
doubt, it will be advantageous to assert priority for as much of any
tax claim as the law permits.
The Boiler Plate of Section 5
Section 5 of Public Law 89-496 has puzzled many readers. It does not
amend any section of the Bankruptcy Act. It purports to save from
release or extinction "any penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred under
the Bankruptcy Act before the effective date of this Act." The tax
liabilities dealt with by Public Law 89496 are not incurred under
Bankruptcy Act. What relevant penalty, forfeiture, or liability is or
can be incurred under the Bankruptcy Act? The criminal provisions of
the Act were taken out and put in Title 18 of the United States Code
back in 1948.131 Although it is not clear who was responsible for including section 5 in this law, it would seem that this provision is additional
evidence of the ancient origin of the bill. This kind of section was
boiler plate at the time it was originally drafted,132 and it has little or
no role to play now.
Applicability to Pending and in Future Cases
An important question now presented is, to what extent do these
bills apply to cases pending when the bills took effect and to operative
facts that occurred before they became effective. This kind of question
may arise with respect to every act that does not deal explicitly with it,
131 18 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).

132 Substantially identical clauses were included in the Chandler Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 11255 (1954); the Referees' Salary and Expense Act, 11 U.S.C. § 53 (1946); the 1950 amendments of §§ 60 and 70c, 64 Stat. 27 (1950); and the Omnibus Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 438
(1952). It did not appear in the Omnibus Act of 1962, 76 Star. 570, or, indeed, in any other

recent amendments of the Bankruptcy Act. Weinstein attributed derivation of the provi.
sion as included in the Chandler Act to the 1926 amendment of the Bankruptcy Act
(44 Stat. 667). He added, "It is a necessary and sound protecting provision." WL smNo
THEx BANx.Rup=Y LAW OF 1938, 363 (1938).
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and Public Law 89-495 does not deal with it. Insofar as the statute
codifies existing law, there is, of course, no problem. The new sections
1 (29a), 67b, 67c(3) in most circuits, 67c(5), and 70c except new clause
(2) codify existing law. The other parts will not present many questions of retroactive applicability.
Public Law 89-496 says in section 5(b) that it governs cases pending
when it took effect, October 3, 1966. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that
this contemplates a redistribution in every case not closed when tax
collectors have already received more than they are entitled to under
the new legislation, or that a discharge already granted in a pending
proceeding cuts off state tax claims (i.e., those over three years old and
not excepted).
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